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I. INTRODUCTION 
“The right to swing my fist ends where the other man’s nose 
begins” is an axiom not always, but often attributed to Oliver Wendell 
Holmes.1 Whichever learned individual penned it, the quotation 
                                                           
ǂ Deborah Alexander is a 2L at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. Thanks to the Mitchell 
Hamline Law Review team for your valuable edits. To my family, broad and narrow, whose 
love, inspiration, and extra chores facilitated this otherwise unthinkable addition to my to-do 
list. A: Bigger than the universe. E: Everywhere and always. 
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exemplifies the omnipresent and judicially confounding tension between 
“freedom of” and “freedom from” speech and expression. 
In reviewing In re Welfare of A.J.B., the Minnesota Supreme 
Court invalidated Minnesota’s stalking-by-mail statute and narrowed the 
mail-harassment statute.2 Under the first statute, stalking-by-mail occurs 
when a person “repeatedly mails or delivers or causes the delivery by any 
means, including electronically, of letters, telegrams, messages, packages”3 
and “the actor knows or has reason to know [this conduct] would cause the 
victim under the circumstances to feel frightened, threatened, oppressed, 
persecuted, or intimidated.”4 Pursuant to the second statute, mail 
harassment occurs when an actor “with the intent to abuse, disturb, or cause 
distress, repeatedly mails or delivers or causes the delivery by any means, 
including electronically, of letters, telegrams, or packages.”5 
The court determined both statutes were sufficiently overbroad 
and violated the First Amendment.6 While the court invalidated the first 
statute in its entirety, it saved the second statute by severing the overbroad 
language.7 In doing so, the court balanced the importance of maintaining 
the protections offered by the statute with the constitutional right to free 
speech. 
This Paper examines the court’s decision and whether it could 
have (and should have) gone further to protect Minnesotans’ safety while 
maintaining their First Amendment protections. The Paper begins with a 
history of significant cases and government action involving the First 
Amendment that both broadened and narrowed protected speech and 
expressive conduct.8 This Part also explores some of the limited exceptions 
to First Amendment protections.9 The Paper then discusses the facts and 
procedural posture of In re Welfare of A.J.B.10 Next, it explores the 
overbreadth doctrine in relation to A.J.B., how speech can be considered 
conduct, and whether hate speech should maintain constitutional 
protection.11 Then, the Paper looks at the First Amendment in a modern 
context, specifically how private actors intervene to fill the gaps left by the 
                                                           
1 Bob Hooper, Freedom, Responsibility, and Accountability, THE HAYS DAILY NEWS (July 
14, 2016), https://www.hdnews.net/474620df-b1ff-5873-a1ef-54229ac61a4f.html 
[https://perma.cc/9XST-YKX6]. 
2 In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 864 (Minn. 2019). 
3 MINN. STAT. § 609.749, subdiv. 2(6) (2018). 
4 Id. § subdiv. 1. 
5 Id. §  subdiv. 1(3). 
6 A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 864. 
7 Id. 
8 See infra Part II. 
9 See infra Part II. 
10 See infra Part III. 
11 See infra Part IV. 
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government.12 Finally, it concludes that, while the court was correct in its 
ruling on the legal merits of the challenge, it missed an opportunity to create 
additional societal protections by narrowing protected speech, ultimately 
weakening its reasoning.13 
I. HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH 
The United States Constitution guarantees that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”14 This guarantee is 
a bedrock principle of American democracy.15 In the many years since the 
ratification of the First Amendment, the limits and reach of this freedom 
have been tested.16 Protected speech was both restricted and expanded.17 
The overbreadth doctrine is a common mechanism by which to 
challenge First Amendment protections.18 The doctrine holds that “a law 
may be invalidated as overbroad if ‘a substantial number of its applications 
are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate 
sweep.’”19 Decisions in favor of free speech are predicated on this doctrine, 
which is based on the sensitive nature of protected expression.20 The 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Gooding v. Wilson refers to the “transcendent 
value to all society of constitutionally protected expression . . . .”21 One has 
                                                           
12 See infra Part V. 
13 See infra Part VI. 
14 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
15 Steven J. Wermiel, The Ongoing Challenge to Define Free Speech, 43 HUMAN RIGHTS, 
no. 4, 2018, at C2. (“Freedom of speech, Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo declared 
more than 80 years ago, ‘is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form 
of freedom.’”). 
16 See, e.g., id. (“227 years after the first 10 amendments to the U.S. Constitution were ratified 
in 1791 . . . debate continues about the meaning of freedom of speech . . . .”). 
17 Marc O. DeGirolami, The Sickness unto Death of the First Amendment, 42 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 751, 752 (2019). 
18 See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 119 (1990); see also Overbreadth Doctrine, LAW 
LIBRARY – AMERICAN LAW AND LEGAL INFORMATION, 
https://law.jrank.org/pages/8973/Overbreadth-Doctrine.html [https://perma.cc/JGL6-
CQS5] (“One common argument in First Amendment challenges is that the statute is 
overbroad.”). 
19 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (quoting Washington State Grange 
v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)). 
20 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (“[P]ersons whose expression is 
constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal 
sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression.”). 
21 Id. 
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only to probe the authoritarian regimes of North Korea22 or Libya23 to 
observe governments significantly curbing free speech and expression to the 
detriment of their people.24 
At the same time, courts have contrarily favored citizen 
protections over free speech.25 Striking down a law that honors First 
Amendment protections as overbroad has been viewed as having limited 
potency.26 For example, the effect of a federal overbreadth judgment is 
binding solely over the parties to the lawsuit.27 Civil actions can still proceed, 
and the state may pursue criminal prosecutions against nonparties.28 Even at 
the United States Supreme Court level, a law cannot be stricken from a 
state’s statute books, nor can a state be barred from narrowing an 
“invalidated” statute to bring it into constitutional compliance.29 More 
importantly, these overbreadth opinions reason that a state has the right to 
enact and enforce “valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests 
in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally 
unprotected conduct,” including speech that results in conduct.30 While 
such laws may have a chilling effect on speech if they are especially 
overbroad, the negative effects of harmful speech, the reasoning goes, 
                                                           
22 Morse H. Tan, A State of Rightlessness: The Egregious Case of North Korea, 80 MISS. 
L.J. 681, 681 (2010) (discussing North Korea’s “astonishing absence of a free press, free 
speech, and free association rights . . . .”). 
23 Mustafa Fetouri, Freedom of Speech Yet Another Casualty of the Libyan Uprising, THE 
NAT’L NEWS (June 28, 2017), https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/freedom-of-
speech-yet-another-casualty-of-the-libyan-uprising-1.92357 [https://perma.cc/R7J7-FU5V]. 
Libya exemplifies the fragility of these freedoms. After the Arab Spring uprising in 2011, 
previously unavailable free expression flourished, but given the country’s continued political 
instability, once again those rights have precipitously deteriorated. Id. 
24 10 Most Censored Countries, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Sept. 10, 2019), 
https://cpj.org/reports/2019/09/10-most-censored-eritrea-north-korea-turkmenistan-
journalist/ [https://perma.cc/RCM7-S4GL] (detailing the digital censorship, surveillance, and 
traditional methods used to silence media in the top ten most repressive countries). 
25 See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (“When [material involving child 
pornography] bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its 
production, we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and that it is 
permissible to consider these materials as without the protection of the First Amendment.”); 
accord Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972). 
26 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 853 (1991) 
(“Characterized by both the Supreme Court and scholarly commentators as ‘strong 
medicine’ that courts ought to administer cautiously, overbreadth doctrine is frequently a far 




29 Id. at 853–54. 
30 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). 
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should allow a state to exercise its authority to enforce a constitutionally valid 
statute without court intervention.31 
A. Free Speech Origins 
In the early American Republic, the Founders believed “natural 
rights” (things citizens could do without a government) included speaking, 
writing, and publishing.32 In 1789, James Madison referred to freedom of 
speech as a natural right when he proposed constitutional amendments.33 
Perhaps, as a result, the First Amendment cemented the natural right to 
freely express one’s thoughts; however, that right was subject to restrictions 
for the common good.34 Eighteenth-century Americans believed free speech 
was a right, but also believed the government had a right to “constrain 
[speech] in order to achieve or protect certain collective social goods . . . 
assum[ing] that the political community could and should make value 
judgments among different ideas.”35 This idea—that the protection of natural 
rights must be balanced with the enforcement of legal rules—is central to the 
Founders’ belief that the freedoms enshrined in the Constitution are not 
always legally supreme.36 The concept of a “public good” (also described as 
“general welfare” or “public interest”) is the basis for this Paper’s push-back 
on the minimal exceptions to the protection of speech.37 
B. Fluctuating Freedom 
It is little wonder why balancing is such an important tool of First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Even amongst themselves, legislators, courts, 
and advocacy groups utilize inconsistent approaches to First Amendment 
speech protections, both abruptly and systemically reversing course on 
policy and personal ideology over time.  
1. Legislative and Executive Indecision 
Those who made and enforced the laws during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries happily dipped their toes in First Amendment waters, 
running back to shore when it was too cold. The 1798 Sedition Act 
                                                           
31 Id. (“[W]e believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as 
well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”). 
32 Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 265–66 
(2017). 
33 Id. at 264. 
34 Id. at 304–07. 
35 DeGirolami, supra note 17, at 752. 
36 Campbell, supra note 32, at 252–54. 
37 Id. at 253 (defining a public good to be “generally understood as the welfare of the entire 
society.”). 
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criminalized “false and malicious criticism of the Federalist Party—that is, 
the president or Congress.”38 By 1802, all Alien and Sedition Acts had 
expired or been repealed.39 In 1836, the U.S. House of Representatives 
adopted gag rules preventing the discussion of anti-slavery proposals.40 Due 
to opposition on free speech grounds, the House repealed the rules in 
1844.41 Sedition Acts in both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries fared 
similarly. In 1798, John Adams, upset by his critics, pushed for and passed 
a Sedition Act, which restricted criticism against the President.42 When 
Thomas Jefferson assumed the presidency just two years later, the law 
expired and was not renewed.43 Similarly, Congress passed the Sedition Act 
of 1918 to prohibit citizens from speaking out against the government or the 
war, but Congress then repealed the Act in 1921.44 
The next hundred years of American governance proved equally 
vulnerable to the legislative and judicial dance, wherein Congress passed 
politically driven legislation, and the judiciary subsequently imposed 
constitutional limits. The Alien Registration Act of 1940 (also known as the 
Smith Act, after Representative Howard Smith, the Act’s sponsor) made it 
a crime to advocate for the violent overthrow of the government and 
required official government registration of all adult non-citizens.45 While 
the Act was never officially repealed, in 1957, the Supreme Court 
overturned fourteen convictions under the Smith Act,46 citing a violation of 
the First Amendment, which limited it to such a degree that, after Yates, no 
future Smith Act violations were prosecuted.47 
In 1996, there was no clear consensus among the branches of 
government when Congress passed the Communications Decency Act 
(CDA),48 which was immediately challenged on First Amendment grounds 
                                                           
38 Joseph Russomanno, The Right and the Duty: Jefferson, Sedition and the Birth of the First 
Amendment’s Central Meaning, 23 COMM. L. & POL’Y 49, 51 (2017). 
39 Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801); Alien Act of 1798, ch. 58, 
1 Stat. 570, 570–71 (1798) (expired 1801). 
40 Lynn D. Wardle, The Quandary of Pro-Life Free Speech: A Lesson from the Abolitionists, 
62 ALB. L. REV. 853, 930 (1999) (“The abolitionists’ campaign of petitions to abolish slavery 
in the District of Columbia and to prohibit interstate slave trade also provoked efforts to 
suppress anti-slavery free speech.”). 
41 Id. at 933. 
42 Russomanno, supra note 38, at 64–65, 75. 
43 Id. at 77. 
44 U.S. Congress Passes Sedition Act, HISTORY.COM, https://www.history.com/this-day-in-
history/u-s-congress-passes-sedition-act [https://perma.cc/P34C-SZQE]. 
45 Alien Registration Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2835 (1940). 
46 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 301, 338 (1957). 
47 Yates v. United States, BRITANNICA.COM, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Yates-v-
United-States [https://perma.cc/6WWG-4QPS]. 
48 William A. Sodeman, Communications Decency Act, BRITANNICA.COM, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Communications-Decency-Act [https://perma.cc/NW5D-
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and struck down by the Supreme Court a mere twelve months later.49 The 
Court concluded that the CDA was too vague and trampled on protected 
speech.50  
2.  Judicial Vacillation 
The Supreme Court, as a body, similarly does not have a unified 
historical posture on the extent to which speech should be protected.51 
The Supreme Court of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
sanctioned free speech with great latitude in the decisions of the few related 
cases it heard.52 It is no surprise that early American courts aimed to test-
drive the First Amendment to see how she handled on the open road. After 
decades of monarchical rule, a successful revolution, and the arduous 
construction of a new form of government and Constitution, it makes 
perfect sense that the nineteenth century opened a large umbrella of free 
speech protection.53 
During the first half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
began paying closer attention to free speech issues, causing judicial whiplash 
as it ruled and then overruled itself.54 At a time marked by war and its 
aftermath, and filled with suspicion and paranoia, it is understandable that 
the Court preferred a narrow view of what speech can be protected. 
In 1919, the Court weighed in with a trio of cases affirming the 
curtailment of free speech during wartime to protect the general welfare.55 
                                                           
P4EJ] (“The CDA created a criminal cause of action against those who knowingly transmit 
‘obscene’ or ‘indecent’ messages, as determined by local community standards, to a recipient 
under the age of 18 years.”). 
49 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997). 
50 Id. at 874. 
51 Luke Meier, A Broad Attack on Overbreadth, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 113, 117 (2005) 
(“Unfortunately, it is impossible to identify a unified theory for how courts decide free speech 
cases.”). 
52 Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2179 
(2015) (noting that the Court, in that period, ruled broadly in favor of free speech protections, 
concluding only once that a particular kind of expression did not fall under the umbrella of 
First Amendment protection. See State v. Blair, 60 N.W. 486, 487 (1894) (holding that a law 
prohibiting “itinerant vender[s]” from publicly advertising their ability to treat diseases did 
not violate the state constitutional guarantees of speech and press freedom).  
53 See, e.g., Dailey v. Superior Ct. of S. F., 44 P. 458, 459 (1896) (“The production of a 
tragedy or comedy upon the theatrical stage is a publication to the world by word of mouth 
of the text of the author” and is therefore protected by the free speech and press provision 
of the California Constitution). 
54See infra Part II.B. 
55 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 53 (1919) (holding that the Espionage Act was 
not a violation of the First Amendment); accord Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216–
17 (1919) (holding that Mr. Debs’s First Amendment rights were not violated when he was 
convicted under the Espionage Act); accord Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 
(1919) (holding that the Espionage Act is constitutional). 
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Enshrining into our lexicon the enduring (if simplistic) axiom about yelling 
fire in a crowded theater, Oliver Wendell Holmes created a conditional 
standard for protected speech: what can be said in times of peace may not 
be legal during times of war. This conditional standard has become known 
as the “clear and present danger” test.56 A “clear and present danger” is one 
that “will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to 
prevent.”57  
Further prioritizing the protection of the public interest from the 
harmful consequences of speech, in 1942, the Court found that the First 
Amendment did not protect “fighting words.”58 Similarly, in West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette, the West Virginia School Board’s 
policy requiring the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance was found 
unconstitutional.59 The Court further narrowed free speech by adding 
another unprotected category: obscenity.60 Hearkening back to the 1919 
cases61 and embodying the chill on free speech wrought by McCarthyism, 
the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of citizens who spoke about 
overthrowing the government.62 Due to the political climate, the first fifty 
years of the twentieth century saw First Amendment rights take a back seat 
to protections of “the public good.”63 
Conversely, the latter half of the twentieth century saw the 
Supreme Court reverse course and put its weight behind the protection of 
free speech and expression, reflecting decades of progressive social and 
political upheaval. Fifty years after Justice Holmes penned the “clear and 
present danger” test in Schenck, Brandenburg v. Ohio completed the test’s 
evolution for First Amendment speech protections.64 The Brandenburg test 
                                                           
56 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
57 Id. 
58 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining “fighting words” as 
those which “by their very utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of 
the peace” and “such utterances [that] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and 
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from 
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”). 
59 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that the 
First Amendment cannot enforce consensus of opinion on an issue or idea). 
60 See generally Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957); see also Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (creating a three-pronged test to determine whether and which speech 
is obscene); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–51 (1978) (clarifying the difference 
between “indecent” and “obscene” and granting the FCC the power to fine networks for 
broadcasting indecent content). 
61 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 53; Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
62 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 590–91 (1951) (Douglass, J., dissenting). 
63 See Campbell, supra note 32, at 253 (defining “public good”). 
64 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969); Remarks of William Van Alstyne on the 
Brandenburg Panel, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 85, 86 (2011) (“The Brandenburg test thus 
8
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dictates that speech can be punished only “where such advocacy is directed 
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action.”65 Holmes’s Schenck opinion was so emphatically 
overruled that Justice Black filed a brief concurrence in Brandenburg, 
stating that “the ‘clear and present danger’ doctrine should have no place in 
the interpretation of the First Amendment.”66 Affirming that even hate 
speech is protected under the Constitution as long as it does not incite 
violence, Brandenburg was a landmark decision in the expansion of the First 
Amendment shield.67 
Cases that reflected the shift in the Court’s increasingly 
protectionist attitude toward First Amendment speech continued to mount. 
In a major win for student activists in 1969, the Court held it 
unconstitutional for school officials to censor student expression (in this 
case, black armbands to protest U.S. involvement in Vietnam).68 The Court 
theorized that prohibiting only specific political symbols (anti-Vietnam 
armbands) effectively prohibits the expression of one particular opinion and 
is unconstitutional.69 In Cohen v. California, the Supreme Court reversed 
the conviction of a man charged with disturbing the peace by wearing a 
jacket containing a visible expletive.70 The Court wrote, “[O]ne can[not] 
forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing 
ideas in the process.”71 Another school-related case, Board of Education v. 
Pico, held that books could not be banned from school libraries based on 
the books’ content or message.72 Flag burning was also decriminalized in 
Texas v. Johnson when the Court ruled the activity constituted political 
protest and was, therefore, a form of symbolic speech that is protected by 
the First Amendment.73 
Analysis of the Court’s shift in attitude toward the First 
Amendment over the twentieth century cannot be done without recognizing 
the historical context in which it occurred. Similar to the Framers’ 
reactionary interest in opening a wide umbrella of free speech protections 
after years of monarchical rule, the post-1950s Court decisions reflected the 
                                                           
became the central First Amendment test in respect to political advocacy and criminal law, 
federal and state, more than a half-century ago.”). 
65 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
66 Id. at 449–50 (Black, J., concurring). 
67 Id. at 447. 
68 Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
69 Id. at 510–11. 
70 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26 (1971) (indicating both the expression of emotion 
and ideas are protected under the First Amendment). 
71 Id. at 26. 
72 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871–72 (1982) (finding that school board authority 
does not supersede that of the First Amendment regarding ideas). 
73 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399, 418 (1989). 
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atmosphere of social unrest occurring across the country; a possible 
acknowledgment that (largely) unfettered speech is a necessary conduit for 
change. 
3.  Extra-Governmental Equivocation 
Looking outside the realm of government, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), perhaps the staunchest (and oldest, at 97 years) 
advocacy group for First Amendment protections, recently engaged in a 
reversal of course. In 2017, the ACLU of Virginia successfully litigated on 
behalf of an “alt-right” activist, claiming his First Amendment rights were 
being denied by the city’s refusal to allow his group to engage in a public 
“Unite the Right” march.74 Amid criticism for supporting a hate group, 
Anthony Romero, the Executive Director of the ACLU, justified the 
group’s position, responding that “[p]reventing the government from 
controlling speech is absolutely necessary to the promotion of equality.”75 
After a bystander, Heather Heyer, was intentionally run down (and killed) 
at that rally, some ACLU chapters declared they no longer believed free-
speech protections apply to events like the one in Charlottesville.76 Mr. 
Romero promised that the entire ACLU would “screen clients more closely 
for the potential of violence” and would no longer defend hate groups if 
they protest while carrying guns.77 While the ACLU is not expressing a 
capricious ideological shift, this indecisiveness exemplifies the vacillating 
boundaries of the First Amendment. 
Another example of First Amendment hedging is social media 
platform Twitter’s recent prohibition of posts that wish a person, including 
the President, death, disease, or serious bodily harm.78 This is a major policy 
reversal as, since its inception in 2006, Twitter has been infamous for 
                                                           
74 Kessler v. City of Charlottesville, 441 F. Supp. 3d 277 (W.D. Va. 2020); see also Kessler 
v. Charlottsville, ACLU VIRGINIA, https://acluva.org/en/cases/kessler-v-charlottesville 
[https://perma.cc/D773-MVXH]. 




76 Dara Lind, Why the ACLU is Adjusting its Approach to “Free Speech” After 
Charlottesville, VOX (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.vox.com/2017/8/20/16167870/aclu-hate-
speech-nazis-charlottesville [https://perma.cc/RDJ8-3ET4]. 
77 Joe Palazzolo, ACLU Will No Longer Defend Hate Groups Protesting with Firearms, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/aclu-changes-policy-on-defending-
hate-groups-protesting-with-firearms-1503010167 [https://perma.cc/NWA9-L5KG]. 
78 Bobby Allyn, Facebook, Twitter and TikTok Say Wishing Trump’s Death From COVID-
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allowing hurtful speech to reach its users in the name of the First 
Amendment.79 
C. Some Exceptions to First Amendment Protections 
Amid the back and forth discussed in the Section above,80 the 
Supreme Court illustrated its reluctance to expand the list of precedented 
exceptions to protected speech. In addition to false statements, two more 
categories of unprotected speech are “fighting words” and obscenity.81 The 
Supreme Court explained in detail: 
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not 
absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are 
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention and punishment of which have never been 
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include 
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the 
insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace.82 
The Minnesota Supreme Court was of a similar mind in In re 
Welfare of A.J.B.83 The court stated that “the legitimate purpose of the 
[mail-harassment] statute [is to] prevent harm,”84 concurring that exceptions 
may be warranted when they would prevent injury to another. 
1. Fighting Words 
There is good reason and precedent for exempting fighting words 
from protected speech. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Chaplinsky, 
“‘Resort[ing] to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense 
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, 
and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that 
instrument.’”85 When compared with freedom of expression, the Court 
                                                           
79 Tweets Wishing for Trump’s Death Violate Twitter Policy, Company Says, GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/oct/02/twitter-trump-death-
threats-covid-19-policy [https://perma.cc/38GN-M56P]. 
80 Supra, Part II (B)(2). 
81 KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND 
PRESS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (2014). 
82 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
83 In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 2019). 
84 Id. at 861. 
85 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–10 
(1940)). 
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reasoned that fighting words may, indeed, have expressive intent, but that 
the expression is not worthy of protection given the harm it causes.86 
In addition to words that “by their very utterance inflict injury,” 
Chaplinsky’s unprotected fighting words include those that breach the 
peace,87 and in “practically all [such cases], the provocative language which 
was held to amount to a breach of the peace consisted of profane, indecent, 
or abusive remarks directed to the person of the hearer.”88 
2. Obscenity 
Obscenity is an oft-scrutinized category of speech exempted from 
protection.89 Similar to outlining the boundaries of “fighting words,” defining 
“obscene” is challenging.90 The present-day obscenity standard was set in 
Miller v. California when the Court affirmed that obscene materials are not 
protected expression under the First Amendment and created a standard 
for the exception.91 The three-prong test includes: 
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards” would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . (b) whether the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.92 
The Miller test exemplifies the concept of protected speech 
exceptions, but the Court remains hesitant to expand the definition (and, 
thus, the amount of unprotected speech) any further.93 
                                                           
86 Id. (“It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition 
of ideas, and are such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”). 
87 Id. 
88 Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309. 
89 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Am. C.L. Union, 542 U.S. 656, 679–80 (2004); Redrup v. New York, 
386 U.S. 767, 770–72 (1967); A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of 
Pleasure” v. Att’y Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 417–19 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476, 484–85 (1957).  
90 See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964), (Stewart, J., concurring) (conceding 
he cannot precisely define obscenity, “[b]ut I know it when I see it.”). 
91 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (The third prong is adopted by legislatures as 
a means for excepting protected speech in non-obscenity contexts as well, such as the 
regulation of violent video games). See, e.g., Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 808 
(2011). 
92 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. See, e.g., Brown, 564 U.S. at 808. 
93 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Mukasey v. Am. C.L. Union, 555 U.S. 1137 
(2009), which could have broadened obscenity law beyond the parameters of the Miller test. 
The lower court ruled in favor of the ACLU and protected speech. Am. C.L. Union v. 
Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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3.  The Argument for Purposeful Expansions 
The intransigence to expand exceptions is a boon for First 
Amendment advocates eager to maintain broad protection of speech, but 
the hypocrisy and narrow concept of freedom are easy to spot. Courts have 
cited child protection as a primary reason for limiting obscene expression.94 
For example, Ginsberg v. New York empowers the state to regulate the well-
being of its children.95 The Court said that “even where there is an invasion 
of protected freedoms ‘the power of the state to control children’s conduct 
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults . . . .’”96 The priorities 
of our society are laid bare, then, when protecting minors from (one might 
embellish the notion as “freedom from”) such tangible evils as bullying, 
harassment, and inducement to suicide do not triumph over free speech in 
the way sharing pornographic content might have.  
Even if a new category of exception for bullying and hate speech 
is not warranted, Chaplinsky reminds us that such categories of speech are 
much closer to the allowable exception of “fighting words” than the 
communication of an idea. Because these words can easily be construed as 
“abusive,” they pass Cantwell’s “breach the peace” test and should have 
qualified as fighting words.97 
Overall hesitance to reduce certain instances of First Amendment 
protection appears to be based on fear of a societal slippery slope.98 The 
thinking is that if an exception to First Amendment speech protection is 
created, any and all free speech (and democracy itself) is put at risk: “If we 
start punishing speech, advocates argue, then we will slide down the slippery 
slope to tyranny.”99 However, over time the Supreme Court increased 
exceptions to protected speech to include obscenity, fighting words, and 
defamatory statements,100 and Americans continue to enjoy broad protection 
of ideas and expression. At the same time, we remain vulnerable to bullying 
                                                           
94 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (“We do not regard New York’s 
regulation in defining obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors under 17 as involving an 
invasion of such minors’ constitutionally protected freedoms.”). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. (quoting Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)). 
97 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (referencing Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–10 (1940)). 
98 Alan M. Dershowitz, A Dangerous Slippery Slope, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/09/19/can-speech-be-limited-for-public-
workers/a-dangerous-slippery-slope [https://perma.cc/S33M-DAAJ].  
99 Kent Greenfield, The Limits of Free Speech, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/the-limits-of-free-speech/387718/ 
[https://perma.cc/QG9H-KW42]. 
100 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 15 (1973) (discussing obscenity); Chaplinsky, 
315 U.S. at 573 (discussing fighting words); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964) (discussing defamation). 
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and stalking.101 It is no surprise that the issue of whether an expansion of 
exceptions to protected speech is more or less a public good is a question 
that continues to vex our courts. 
D. Free Speech in Minnesota 
In re Welfare of A.J.B.102 is a Minnesota case dealing with state 
police powers (those that establish and enforce laws protecting the welfare, 
safety, and health of the public).103 Because these powers are reserved to the 
states,104 it is germane to this analysis to examine Minnesota’s own 
inconsistent history of free speech jurisprudence. 
In 1981, a Minnesota free speech case, Near v. Minnesota, found 
its way to the Supreme Court and was so impactful that it was 
contemporaneously recognized as a game-changer.105 “Contemporaries saw 
Near as a landmark, with one legal commentator on freedom of the press 
characterizing the case as ‘the most important decision rendered since the 
adoption of the [F]irst [A]mendment.’”106 In 1925, Minnesota passed a 
statute known as the Minnesota Gag Law, which permitted a judge, acting 
without a jury, to stop publication of any periodical the judge found 
“obscene, lewd, and lascivious” or “malicious, scandalous, and 
defamatory.”107 The statute permitted periodicals’ permanent enjoinment 
from future publication.108 
The Minnesota Supreme Court opinion, from which Near 
(reviewed sub nom)109 was granted certiorari, embraced the supremacy of 
state police power and rejected the idea that First Amendment freedoms 
outweighed issues of public welfare.110 The court held: 
Under modern authorities there can be no doubt that the 
police power includes all regulations designed to promote 
public convenience, happiness, general welfare, and 
prosperity, an orderly state of society, the comfort of the 
                                                           
101 See, e.g., infra Part III.A. 
102 929 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 2019). 
103 Police Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
104 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
105 Paul L. Murphy, Near v. Minnesota in the Context of Historical Developments, 66 MINN. 
L. REV. 95, 97 (1981). 
106 Id. (quoting Eberhard P. Deutsch, Freedom of the Press and of the Mails, 36 MICH. L. 
REV. 703, 749 (1938)). 
107 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 702 (1931) (quoting Mason's Minnesota Statutes, 1927, 
§§ 10123-1–1203-3). 
108 Id. at 703. 
109 Sub Nomine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed., 2019) (“[I]ndicate[s] that there has 
been a name change from one stage of the case to another.”). 
110 State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 459 (1928) (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 
U.S. 133, 140 (1894)). 
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people, and peace, and that it extends to all great public 
needs as well as to regulations designed to promote public 
health, morals, or safety.111  
The court also believed the legislature had the authority and right 
to decide both what is in the public’s best interest and how to protect those 
interests.112 
The Near Court reversed, however, prioritizing the press’s First 
Amendment protections over public welfare.113 This principle was 
successively applied to free speech in general.114 Tugs-of-war between these 
oft-competing freedoms continue to dominate in Minnesota.115 
Minnesota’s Constitution is silent on any guarantee of freedom of 
speech and expression.116 However, the First Amendment applies to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment,117 which is codified in 
Minnesota’s Constitution.118  
Free speech protection rulings by the Minnesota Supreme Court 
mirror the inconsistent holdings of the Supreme Court. In Knudtson v. City 
of Coates, Minnesota favored police powers over First Amendment rights.119 
The court held that a city ordinance barring nude dancing in licensed liquor 
establishments was a reasonable exercise of police power120 and did not 
violate the free speech provision of the Minnesota Constitution121 (and, thus, 
the First Amendment).122 Similar modern Minnesota cases abound.123 State 
                                                           
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Near, 283 U.S. at 737–38. 
114 Id. at 707 (“[The Minnesota gag rule] raises questions of grave importance transcending 
the local interests involved in the particular action. It is no longer open to doubt that the 
liberty of the press and of speech is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion of state action.”) (emphasis added). 
115 Compare Knudtson v. City of Coates, 519 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Minn. 1994) (detailing a 
narrow free speech ruling), with State v. Hensel, 901 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. 2017). 
116 See MINN. CONST. art. I. 
117 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (applying the first ten amendments of the United States 
Constitution to the states); see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“[W]e 
may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press . . . are among the fundamental 
personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from impairment by the States.”). 
118 MINN. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
119 See Knudtson, 519 N.W.2d at 169 (“The [municipality’s] police power may be used to 
protect . . . ‘the public health, safety, and general welfare’ of the community.”). 
120 Id. at 169. 
121 Id. 
122 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
123 For cases that detail a lack of statutory overbreadth see, State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914 
(Minn. 2017); DI MA Corp. v. St. Cloud, 562 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); State v. 
Kakosso, No. A12–0401, 2012 WL 6652598 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2012). 
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v. Hensel, however, illustrates Minnesota’s converse stance, invalidating the 
disorderly conduct statute as overbroad and, thus, violative of the First 
Amendment.124 Similar modern Minnesota cases abound.125 
Recent Minnesota rulings also embody the inconsistency in the 
state courts’ definition and application of “fighting words.” Calling a police 
officer a “white racist mother***ker” and wishing his mother would die 
were considered fighting words and, thus, unprotected by the First 
Amendment.126 However, yelling “fuck you all” to a police officer and 
security personnel at a nightclub did not qualify as the use of fighting words 
and was, therefore, protected speech.127 
Serving as a bookend to this Section, the Supreme Court recently 
heard another First Amendment Minnesota case, further demonstrating the 
delicate balance between freedom of speech and freedom from speech.128 A 
Minnesota statute prohibits individuals from wearing a “political badge, 
political button, or other political insignia” inside a polling location.129 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts explained that some forms 
of advocacy should be excluded from the polling place due to the sensitive 
and private nature of voting.130 In this holding, the Supreme Court expressed 
the importance of being flexible, rather than absolute, when it comes to 
protecting speech, and particularly when the recipient is vulnerable.131 This 
is a lesson the A.J.B. court should have heeded. Would that the A.J.B. court 
took notice. 
III.  IN RE WELFARE OF A.J.B. 
A.  Facts and Procedural Posture 
In 2016, A.J.B., a juvenile, sent approximately forty vicious, 
personal messages on Twitter, directed at M.B., a juvenile diagnosed with 
autism and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.132 The messages 
contained homophobic language, insults, and slurs, mocked M.B.’s 
                                                           
124 State v. Hensel, 901 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. 2017). 
125 For cases that affirm statutory overbreadth see, State v. Jorgenson, 946 N.W.2d 596 (Minn. 
2020); State v. Peterson, 936 N.W.2d 912 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019); Polinsky v. Bolton, No. 
3:11CR190, 2017 WL 2224391 (Minn. Ct. App. May 22, 2017). 
126 State v. Clay, No. CX-99-343, 1999 WL 711038, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1999). 
127 Cornelious v. Brubaker, No. 01CV1254, 2003 WL 21511125, at *14 (D. Minn. June 25, 
2003).  
128 Minnesota Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018). 
129 Id. at 1879. 
130 Id. at 1887. 
131 Id. at 1885. 
132 In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 2019). 
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disabilities, and encouraged M.B. to kill himself.133 The tweets were sent 
within a two- to three-hour period, and were designed to “teach [M.B.] a 
lesson.”134 After viewing these tweets, M.B. felt suicidal.135 A.J.B. was charged 
under the Minnesota stalking-by-mail and mail-harassment statutes.136 
Subsequently, the juvenile court found A.J.B. “delinquent” on all counts.137 
In its opinion, the juvenile court said the tweets were “cruel and [went] 
beyond any measure of human decency.”138 A.J.B. appealed, and the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.139 
B.  Minnesota Supreme Court 
Under a theory of constitutional overbreadth, A.J.B. appealed the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision to the Minnesota Supreme Court.140 
Of concern to the court was the balance between the chilling effect resulting 
from the proscription of constitutionally-protected speech and the 
protections afforded by the stalking-by-mail and mail-harassment statutes.141 
Following the Supreme Court’s example, the court laid out a three-factor 
test to determine whether a statute is overbroad in the context of the spirit 
in which it was drafted.142 
First, the court must understand the scope and sweep of the 
statute.143 Second, the court determines whether the statute prohibits 
protected speech or expressive conduct.144 If so, the third and final factor is 
whether the amount of speech prohibited is “substantial” relative to the 
amount of prohibited, unprotected speech.145 If the court finds the statute to 
be overbroad and unconstitutional, it must ascertain whether the statute can 
be saved by severing the overbroad language.146 
                                                           
133 Id. at 845. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 




140 Id. at 846. 
141 Id. at 847 (“[W]e tread carefully as we balance the constitutional demands of the First 
Amendment against society’s interest in protecting Minnesotans’ safety, health, and 
welfare.”). 
142 Id. at 847–48; see also United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 
293 (2008) (discussing how to determine if a statute is overbroad). 
143 A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 847. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 848. 
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In the case at hand, the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed both 
the stalking-by-mail and the mail-harassment statutes.147 Concerning the 
stalking-by-mail statute,148 the court found the language—particularly with 
regard to the negligence standard and wide-ranging potential victim 
reactions—to be overbroad.149 The court determined the scope and sweep of 
the statute was “substantial” and “tethered closely to speech or expressive 
conduct.”150 As to the second interpretive factor, the court recalled its prior 
finding that it is not enough for the offending speech itself to be illegal, but 
that the conduct related to the speech must be illegal.151 In this case, the 
statute did not criminalize speech because it was connected to a criminal 
act; rather, “the statute criminalizes the communication itself . . . .”152 
Therefore, this finding indicated to the court that the statute prohibited 
protected speech. To the final element of substantiality, the court found 
that, while the statute covered both protected and unprotected speech, the 
proportion of protected speech was high enough to be considered 
“substantial.”153 The court stated that because of the “substantial ways in 
which subdivision 2(6) can prohibit and chill protected expression, we 
conclude that the statute facially violates the First Amendment overbreadth 
doctrine.”154 
  The court also interpreted the mail-harassment statute155 using 
dictionary definitions, but it said the terms must be used in context.156 They 
also found that this statute required an intention “to cause a specific type of 
                                                           
147 Id. at 848–51, 857–59. 
148 MINN. STAT. § 609.749, subdiv. 2(b)(6) (2020). 
149 A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 851 (“[The statute] criminalizes the mailing or delivery of any form 
of communication that an actor directs more than once at a specific person who the actor 
‘knows or has reason to know’ would cause (after considering the victim’s specific life 
circumstances) [and does cause] that person to feel ‘frightened, threatened, oppressed, 
persecuted, or intimidated . . . .’”) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.749, subdiv. 1). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 852 (citing State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn. 2014)); see also id. 
(citing Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 
CORNELL L. REV. 981, 1011 (2016)) (“It is not enough that the speech itself be labeled illegal 
conduct . . . Rather, it must help cause or threaten other illegal conduct . . . which may make 
restricting the speech a justifiable means of preventing that other conduct.”). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 853. 
154 Id. at 856 (emphasis added).  
155 MINN. STAT. § 609.795, subdiv. 1(3) (2018) (“Whoever does any of the following is guilty 
of a misdemeanor . . . (3) with the intent to harass or intimidate another person, repeatedly 
mails or delivers or causes the delivery by any means, including electronically, of letters, 
telegrams, or packages . . . .”). 
156 A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 858 (“[The court must] keep[] in mind the context of the statute 
which is focused on the intent of the person sending and the reactions of the person receiving 
letters, telegrams, or packages.”). 
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harm,” but the victim need not suffer any actual harm.157 For the second 
factor, the court decided statutorily that the proscribed speech was not 
independently related to criminal conduct.158 Unlike the stalking-by-mail 
statute, this provision did not require the victim to suffer a tangible harm or 
experience actual abuse. The only requirement is that the actor intended 
the victim to suffer.159 Third, the court similarly determined the amount of 
protected speech prohibited in the statute was substantial when compared 
with “the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”160 It concluded the only 
legitimate purpose in prohibiting the mailing of an item with the intent to 
cause harm is to prevent said harm from happening.161 Therefore, with no 
requirement for harm to actually occur, “the Legislature criminalized 
behavior, including substantial speech and expressive conduct, that will have 
no impact on the statute’s legitimate purpose of preventing harm.”162 
After determining both statutes to be constitutionally overbroad, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court examined the potential to remedy the 
statutes by severing the problematic language.163 The court determined the 
stalking-by-mail statute could not be saved, as severing the necessary 
language would disconnect the statute from its legislative intent164 and render 
it “incapable of being executed.”165 On the contrary, the court found that the 
mail-harassment statute could be sufficiently narrowed by severing the 
overbroad language (“disturb, or cause distress”),166 thereby saving the 
statute.167 
Given the invalidation of the statute, the court reversed the lower 
court’s decision regarding the stalking-by-mail verdict.168 On the mail-
harassment verdict, the court remanded the case to the juvenile court to be 
adjudicated under the redrawn statute.169 Three justices dissented in part, 
                                                           
157 Id. at 858–59. 
158 Id. at 859. 
159 Id. at 858–59. 
160 Id. at 860. 
161 Id. at 861. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 856. 
164 Id. at 847 (“The Legislature’s interest in protecting all Minnesotans, and particularly our 
more vulnerable neighbors, from such conduct is proper and serious.”). 
165 Id. at 856 (citing State v. Hensel, 901 N.W.2d 166, 179 (2017) (“We cannot rewrite the 
statute to narrow it . . . . It would be ‘inconsistent with the statute’s text’ . . . . We conclude 
that there are legitimate reasons to doubt that the Legislature would have enacted Minn. Stat. 
§ 609.749, subd. 1, without the negligence standard.”) (internal citations omitted). 
166 Id. at 857 (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.795, subdiv. 1(3), as original); see also id. at 863 (citing 
MINN. STAT. § 609.795, subdiv. 1(3), as amended). 
167 Id. at 863. 
168 Id. at 864. 
169 Id. 
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arguing the court had enough factual evidence from the juvenile court to 
affirm the decision, even under the newly narrowed statute.170 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A. The Overbreadth of A.J.B. 
Under the free speech overbreadth doctrine, a litigant argues that 
a statute should be struck down because it could be applied 
unconstitutionally in certain hypothetical fact patterns and those situations 
substantially outweigh the number of potential constitutional applications.171 
Laws that encompass any (or too much) protected speech foster an 
environment ripe for complicated legal overbreadth challenges.172 In United 
States v. Williams, the Court simplified this issue: “The [overbreadth] 
doctrine seeks to strike a balance between competing social costs.”173  
The Supreme Court’s overbreadth doctrine is mirrored on the 
state level by the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling in A.J.B.,174 which 
exemplifies the doctrine’s complexity. To determine the sweep of the 
Minnesota statutes, the court painstakingly defined the words central to the 
statutes: “stalking,” “deliver,” “repeatedly,” “disturb,” “distress,” and 
“abuse.”175 These words can be viewed as legitimately protected speech, such 
as “delivering” letters to “disturb” an elected official.176 At the same time, the 
court recognized there is no legitimate rationale for the word “abuse” to be 
swept into protected speech, commenting, “unlike the terms ‘disturb’ and 
‘distress,’ the term ‘abuse’ is more narrowly cast and the injury intended 
                                                           
170 Id. at 865 (Chutich, J., concurring). 
171 Meier, supra note 51 at 131–32. 
172 Christopher A. Pierce, “The Strong Medicine” of the Overbreadth Doctrine: When 
Statutory Exceptions are No More than a Placebo, 64 FED. COM. L.J. 177, 182 (2011) 
(explaining the two purposes of the overbreadth doctrine: (1) to prevent the chilling of 
protected speech; and (2) to incentivize legislatures to tailor their statutes narrowly, so as not 
to face constitutional challenges). 
173 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (comparing the chill on free speech 
with the invalidation of constitutionally sound laws that protect individuals from “antisocial” 
conduct). 
174 A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 847 (“[W]e tread carefully as we balance the constitutional demands 
of the First Amendment against society’s interest in protecting Minnesotans’ safety, health, 
and welfare.”).  
175 Id. at 849, 858–59. It is important to read these definitions to understand the impact these 
words have, beyond the broad scope of the terms. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2019) which defines “abuse” as “physical or mental maltreatment, often resulting 
in mental, emotional, sexual, or physical injury.” This specificity exhibits the magnitude of 
harm as well as the reach of the conduct. 
176 A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 853. 
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much more substantial.”177 Therein lies the precarious balancing act thrust 
upon the court. 
In Williams, the Court provided specificity to the overbreadth 
doctrine and when a statute can be invalidated.178 The Court stated, “[i]n 
order to maintain an appropriate balance, we have vigorously enforced the 
requirement that a statute’s overbreadth be substantial, not only in an 
absolute sense, but also relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”179 
The Court reasoned that the competing social costs of the “free exchange 
of ideas” and conduct that is “so antisocial that it has been made criminal” 
must be weighed.180 
The A.J.B. court seemed to employ a similar “substantiality” test 
when it asked, “Does the statute prohibit a ‘substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected speech[?]’”181 The court found that the Minnesota 
statute at issue contained both protected and unprotected expression, but 
the court had to determine which expression substantially tipped the scale.182 
The court reasoned that the terms used in the statute were broad enough 
that delivering a complaint letter meant to “cause distress” to a politician or 
businessperson would be criminalized, and this expression is protected.183 
B.  “Strong Medicine” 
Courts recognize how drastic a measure it is to nullify or modify 
a statute, noting that “invalidation for overbreadth is ‘strong medicine’ that 
is not to be ‘casually employed.’”184 Therefore, consideration is often given 
to legislative intent when weighing free speech against statutory 
protections.185 The Minnesota Legislature’s clear intent in devising the 
                                                           
177 Id. at 863. 
178 Williams, 553 U.S. at 292. 
179 Id.  
180 Id. 
181 A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 847 (quoting State v. Hensel, 901 N.W.2d 166, 171–72 (Minn. 
2017)); see also supra Part IV.A (discussing the overbreadth doctrine). 
182 A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 847. 
183 Id. at 862. 
184 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (“Application of the overbreadth 
doctrine . . . has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort.”); accord 
State v. Turner, 864 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting N.Y. Club Ass’n, Inc. 
v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988)) (“Applying the overbreadth doctrine to invalidate 
a statute . . . is a ‘strong medicine’ that should be ‘used sparingly and only as a last resort.’”). 
See also Williams, 553 U.S. at 293 (quoting Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting 
Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999)). 
185 See Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative 
Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L. J. 427, 435 (2005) (“[L]aws are written in 
language and language can only be understood in context.”); see also Wisconsin Pub. 
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991) (“As for the propriety of using legislative 
history at all, common sense suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing additional 
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stalking-by-mail and mail harassment statutes was to protect the most 
vulnerable citizens from “bullying, stalking, and other forms of 
harassment.”186 
The A.J.B. court, however, preferred to guard against the chilling 
effect on speech that could result instead of upholding the spirit of and 
protections provided by the statutes.187 It reasoned that to avoid a chilling 
effect, it must not expand exceptions to protected speech, despite what the 
Minnesota Legislature intended.188 The court cited the Supreme Court’s 
holding in United States v. Stevens: “‘Our decisions . . . cannot be taken as 
establishing a freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech 
outside the scope of the First Amendment.’”189 Notably, however, the A.J.B. 
court neglected to recognize the portion of the Stevens opinion—in the same 
paragraph—that (1) opened the door for future expansion of protected 
speech exceptions and (2) admonished the government’s flawed process for 
doing so.190 The Stevens Court stated: “We need not foreclose the future 
recognition of such additional categories [of speech outside the scope of the 
First Amendment] to reject the Government’s highly manipulable balancing 
test as a means of identifying them.”191 The A.J.B. court could have used that 
rationale to widen the scope of protected exceptions. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court examined the federal stalking 
statute for comparison to see if it could allow the Minnesota statute to 
stand.192 The federal law penalizes whoever: 
with the intent to kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or place 
under surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or 
intimidate another person, uses the mail, any interactive 
computer service or electronic communication system of 
interstate commerce, or any other facility of interstate or 
foreign commerce to engage in a course of conduct that (A) 
places that person in reasonable fear of the death of or 
serious bodily injury to [the] person or a [family member]; 
or (B) causes, attempts to cause, or would be reasonably 
                                                           
information rather than ignoring it. . . Our precedents demonstrate that the Court’s practice 
of utilizing legislative history reaches well into its past. We suspect that the practice will 
likewise reach well into the future.”) (citation omitted). 
186 A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 847 (Minn. 2019). 
187 Id. at 855, 863. 
188 Id. at 851 (“[T]he Legislature cannot save a statute that is otherwise unconstitutionally 
overbroad by including language stating that the statute does not reach speech or expression 
protected by the First Amendment.”). 
189 Id. at 846 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010)). 
190 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472. 
191 Id.  
192 A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 855. 
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expected to cause substantial emotional distress to [the] 
person [or a family member].193 
When challenged, courts have ruled that the federal statute is not 
overbroad.194 The Minnesota Supreme Court found that, unlike the federal 
statute, the state stalking statute did not require intent.195 Therefore, the 
potential for the act occurring negligently could facilitate a chilling effect on 
speech.196 The federal statute also required a higher burden regarding the 
victim’s reaction to stalking than the state statute.197 
The court did not work hard enough to maintain the protections 
provided by the stalking-by-mail statute using the federal statute as a guide.198 
The federal stalking statute only applies when a person acts with an “intent 
to kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or place under surveillance with intent to 
kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another person.”199 Given that the court 
understood the intent of the Minnesota Legislature to lean toward the 
protection and well-being of its citizens,200 using the federal statute’s 
“malicious intent” standard, it could have applied that standard to the 
Minnesota statute. This application would provide a narrower sweep of 
speech and create a higher burden while maintaining protections for 
children like M.B. 
While the A.J.B. court said it was limited by the overbreadth 
doctrine and the substantial amount of non-protected speech in the statutes, 
it missed an opportunity to further criminalize A.J.B.’s actions and speech. 
In addition to A.J.B.’s speech qualifying as fighting words,201 the court 
discounted Williams, which stated that obscene speech is not protected by 
the First Amendment when it “violates fundamental notions of decency[.]”202 
                                                           
193 Id. at 854 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2018)). 
194 Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Ackell, 907 F.3d 67, 77 (1st Cir. 2018), cert. denied; United 
States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 856 (8th Cir. 2012). 
195 A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 855. 
196 Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.749, subdiv. 5(a) (2020) (“knows or has reason to know” the 
victim would be upset; no intent or knowledge that behavior will harm another person) with 
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1) (2018) (must have “intent to kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or place 
under surveillance . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
197 A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 855 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)) (“The federal statute requires 
proof that a person’s conduct placed the victim or the victim’s family member in ‘reasonable 
fear of [] death [] or serious bodily injury’ or ‘causes, attempts to cause, or would be 
reasonably expected to cause substantial emotional distress’ to the victim or a family member 
of the victim.”). 
198 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 307 (2008) (Stevens, J. concurring) (quoting 
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) “[E]very reasonable construction must be 
resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 
2261A(2) (federal stalking statute). 
199 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1) (emphasis added). 
200 A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 861. 
201 Supra Part II.C.3.  
202 Williams, 553 U.S. at 288. 
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So, too, should speech such as A.J.B.’s be unprotected as it was indisputably 
and fundamentally indecent.203 
Early in its A.J.B. analysis, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
acknowledged that, while the legislature must craft legislation in step with 
the First Amendment, protecting Minnesota’s most vulnerable citizens from 
harassment is simultaneously “proper and serious.”204 In fact, the dissenting 
opinion felt so certain about A.J.B.’s motivation to “abuse” M.B. that it did 
not see the need to remand the case back to the juvenile court and was 
prepared to affirm the delinquency disposition.205 Justice Chutich felt that 
there was no doubt that A.J.B. “specifically intended to abuse M.B.” and 
that there was “overwhelming evidence of A.J.B.’s abusive tweets, 
threatening violence, encouraging suicide, and otherwise demeaning and 
harassing a vulnerable M.B.”206 Given the undisputed facts, the court did not 
need to remand the case back to juvenile court. The court could also have 
noted that A.J.B.’s expression was not, by its nature and intention, 
protected. Instead, the court chose to dispense its “medicine” sparingly. 
C.  Speech as Conduct 
Speech we simply do not like or agree with, or even speech that 
offends, should undoubtedly be protected.207 However, when a person is left 
vulnerable to dangerous, harmful conduct hiding behind the shield of First 
Amendment speech security, we must examine which protection should 
receive priority. 
There is federal precedent for treating expression as conduct and 
weighing that freedom with emotional injury: the Supreme Court 
overturned Plessy v. Ferguson in part because of the psychological harm 
inflicted on children of color due to the conduct manifesting as an 
expression of segregationist ideas.208 In Plessy, the Court considered the 
harm “separate but equal” legislation caused the plaintiffs to be a “fallacy,” 
                                                           
203 See Elizabeth H. Steele, Examining the FCC’s Indecency Regulations in Light of Today’s 
Technology, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 289, 295 (2010) (The FCC deemed indecent language “that 
which is ‘patently offensive by contemporary community standards; and . . . utterly without 
redeeming social value.’”). It would be difficult to argue that A.J.B.’s words did not fit this 
definition of “indecent.” 
204 A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 847. 
205 Id. at 867 (Chutich, J., concurring). 
206 Id. 
207 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (stating that the best remedy for 
speech with which we disagree or find offensive is not censorship of that speech but more 
speech). 
208 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate [children] from others of 
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as 
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever 
to be undone.”). 
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existing only because the plaintiffs chose to feel inferior.209 The Brown Court 
disagreed,210 articulating that segregation expresses the denigration of 
African-American children.211 Brown saw that, under the cover of First 
Amendment protection, public welfare was being harmed precisely because 
the “expression” of segregation had “the sanction of the law[.]”212 “Separate 
but equal” as an idea “has no place,” said the Brown Court, despite being 
an expression of an idea.213 
A justiciable argument persists over whether speech is barred 
from First Amendment protection when it is, in effect, conduct.214 Noted 
cases about the right to burn the U.S. flag or protest government 
involvement in a war show the Court’s interest in protecting conduct-related 
expression.215 But what about statements that, by their nature, are effectively 
illegal conduct—which conduct is covered by applicable and prohibitive 
laws? For example, publishing a book that intentionally explains how to 
commit a crime may constitute aiding and abetting the described crime.216 
The Rice court explains: “[W]hile even speech advocating lawlessness has 
long enjoyed protections under the First Amendment, it is equally well 
established that speech which, in its effect, is tantamount to legitimately 
proscribable non-expressive conduct may itself be legitimately proscribed, 
punished, or regulated incidentally to the constitutional enforcement of 
generally applicable statutes.”217 Plainly, a law prohibiting certain conduct 
may be applicable to speech that produces the effect of such illegal 
conduct.218 
                                                           
209 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
210 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95 (“Whatever may have been the extent of psychological 
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding [of the harm from segregation] is 
amply supported by modern authority. Any language . . . contrary to this finding is rejected.”). 
211 Id. at 494 (“Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental 
effect upon the colored children.”). 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 495. 
214 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399, 418 (1989); see also Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 
U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
215 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399, 418; see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
216 See Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 267 (4th Cir. 1997); see also LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 837 (2d ed. 1988) (“[T]he law need not treat 
differently the crime of one man who sells a bomb to terrorists and that of another who 
publishes an instructional manual for terrorists on how to build their own bombs out of old 
Volkswagen parts.”). 
217 Rice, 128 F.3d at 243. 
218 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (analogizing that if the press 
conducts the illegal act of publishing copyrighted material, it is not immune from prosecution 
simply because the press has general First Amendment protection); accord Associated Press 
v. Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd., 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) (“The publisher of a newspaper has no 
special immunity from the application of general laws.”). 
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Further illustrating the point that speech may qualify as illegal 
conduct, the Supreme Court in R.A.V. v. St. Paul provided that there is no 
First Amendment conflict when speech is imperiled because of generally 
relevant laws.219 The Court applied this reasoning only to speech that already 
falls within existing First Amendment exceptions, like fighting words,220 and 
the A.J.B. court seemed to agree.221 However, included among the R.A.V. 
Court’s listed exceptions is “‘speech integral to criminal conduct.’”222 This 
would seem to bolster the Rice court’s holding that speech producing the 
effect of illegal conduct is a permissible exception to First Amendment 
protection.223 Nonetheless, the A.J.B. court prioritized “balance” in its 
analysis and chose to “tread carefully,” ultimately finding that only 
historically sanctioned exceptions may apply.224 Despite the existence of a 
criminal federal stalking and harassment statute225 and consideration of the 
detrimental effects such conduct has on citizens, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court did not consider either to be “speech integral to criminal conduct,” 
at least not enough to reverse the lower court’s decision.226 
The A.J.B. court used Broadrick v. Oklahoma broadly to 
determine whether the Minnesota statutes prohibited a substantial amount 
of speech,227 but ignored Broadrick’s reasoning that the potential for chilling 
future speech is not the priority when public safety is threatened by conduct 
masquerading as speech.228 Arguably, in A.J.B., the defendant’s cruel words 
were “true threats,” which, acting as conduct, are not protected by the First 
Amendment.229 M.B. is an individual diagnosed with autism—a fact known 
219 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (The government may sweep up speech 
“incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech.”). 
220 Id.; see also id. at 382 (explaining that the Court has “narrowed the scope of the traditional 
categorical exceptions” from First Amendment protections since the 1960s). 
221 In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Minn. 2019). The court, citing United 
States v. Stevens, reasons that while “[t]here is a point where First Amendment protections 
end and government regulation of speech or expressive conduct becomes permissible[,]” 
there are limited, generally recognized exceptions, further noting that new exceptions should 
not be considered lightly. (quotation at 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010)). 
222 Id. 
223 See Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 267 (4th Cir. 1997). 
224 A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 847.  
225 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2018). 
226 A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 864. 
227 Id. at 852. 
228 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 618 (1973). 
229 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (“[T]he First Amendment . . . permits a 
State to ban ‘true threats,’ which encompass those statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a 
particular individual or group of individuals.”) (internal citation omitted); see also R.A.V. v. 
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (Threats of violence are First Amendment exceptions to 
“protect[] individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and 
from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”). 
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and exploited by A.J.B.230 Given A.J.B.’s threats and hateful words, M.B. 
feared being attacked if he returned to school.231  
The A.J.B. court further elucidated the concept of speech as 
conduct when it noted that it is not enough to label speech alone as illegal, 
but the conduct related to that speech must also be illegal.232 A.J.B.’s speech 
included repeatedly encouraging M.B. to commit suicide.233 In its opinion, 
the court references State v. Melchert-Dinkel, which held that expressive 
language or action encouraging a person to commit suicide is protected 
because the act of suicide itself is not illegal.234 Given, however, that 
Minnesota law does criminalize such behavior,235 the A.J.B. court’s reliance 
on Melchert-Dinkel236 is perplexing. 
D.  The Value of Chilling Speech 
A law that allegedly targets or deters free speech and expression 
is said to have a “chilling effect.”237 Given the limited exceptions discussed 
above and the judiciary’s hesitance to expand them, statutes that chill speech 
are frequently challenged and struck down as overbroad.238 Because such 
latitude protects hate speech and, debatably, resultant conduct, one might 
question whether this bedrock protection does more harm than good. 
Brandenburg v. Ohio demonstrated that hate speech is protected 
under the First Amendment.239 According to the Court, even speech that 
advocates violence is protected, so long as it is not likely to produce 
“imminent lawless action.”240 The Ku Klux Klan is “the oldest and most 
infamous of American hate groups,”241 yet Brandenburg prioritized those 
individuals’ hateful words and their incitement of others to commit violent 
230 A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 845 (“One tweet contained a checkerboard of images with M.B.’s 




234 Id. (quoting Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 
CORNELL L. REV. 981, 1011 (2016) (“It is not enough that the speech itself be labeled illegal 
conduct . . . . Rather, it must help cause or threaten other illegal conduct . . . which may 
make restricting the speech a justifiable means of preventing that other conduct.”). 
235 MINN. STAT. § 609.215, subdiv. 1 (2020) (stating that “Whoever intentionally advises, 
encourages, or assists another in taking the other’s own life may be sentenced to 
imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, 
or both” including aiding attempted suicide). 
236 A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 852. 
237 See Jennifer M. Kinsley, Chill, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 253, 255 (2016). 
238 See supra Part II (C). 
239 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969). 
240 Id. at 447. 
241 Ku Klux Klan, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-
hate/extremist-files/ideology/ku-klux-klan [https://perma.cc/F4Y6-DMT3]. 
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acts242 over the negative effects their words no doubt cast on others.243 
However, John Powell, who represented the Ku Klux Klan when he was the 
national legal director of the ACLU, now questions how much weight is 
given to free speech over equality: “[w]hat if we weighed the two as 
conflicting values, instead of this false formalism where the right to speech 
is recognized but the harm caused by that speech is not?”244 This is the 
challenge of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in A.J.B. Powell 
exemplifies the thesis of this Paper when he ponders, “‘We need to protect 
the rights of speakers . . . but what about protecting everyone else?’”245 
M.B.’s right to live free from harassment and bullying was not prioritized. 
The balance between freedom of speech and freedom from 
speech is historically complex and contestable, even for seasoned justices.246 
In a more modern context, this balance is no easier to achieve. In 2019, the 
conviction of three members of the white supremacist “Rise Above 
Movement” was overturned by a federal judge, citing the overbreadth 
doctrine, despite the speech in question causing riots and physical attacks.247 
Yet, across the country, another federal judge reached the opposite 
conclusion in a similar case involving different members of the same hate 
group.248 This issue may soon be in front of the Supreme Court to reconcile 
the contradictory verdicts.249 
                                                           
242 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448. 
243 See, e.g., Brian Mullen & Joshua M. Smyth, Immigrant Suicide Rates as a Function of 
Ethnophaulisms: Hate Speech Predicts Death, 66 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 343, 343 (2004) 
(correlating increased suicide rates among victims of hate speech). 
244 Andrew Marantz, How Social-Media Trolls Turned U.C. Berkeley Into A Free Speech 
Circus, NEW YORKER (June 25, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/07/02/how-social-media-trolls-turned-uc-
berkeley-into-a-free-speech-circus [https://perma.cc/GJJ2-D94J]. 
245 Andrew Marantz, Free Speech is Killing Us, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/opinion/sunday/free-speech-social-media-
violence.html [https://perma.cc/3XEU-83YC]. 
246 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 452 (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925)) 
(quoting Holmes, J., dissenting) (“‘If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian 
dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only 
meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way’ . . . . 
We have never been faithful to the philosophy of that dissent.”). 
247 Brian Melley, Judge: White Supremacist Group’s Actions Protected by Free Speech, 
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While the intention of the Framers regarding the First 
Amendment is unclear,250 surely it was closer to the protection of a citizen’s 
expression of a particular fact or idea, not to aid and abet harassment and 
bullying.251 This position is epitomized in Morse v. Frederick, which held 
that schools are entitled to take steps to safeguard their students from speech 
encouraging illegal drug use.252 The Court compared its earlier and contrary 
ruling in Tinker (upholding free expression in a school environment) with 
that in Morse, arguing that the interest in deterring drug use by 
schoolchildren greatly outweighs that of free speech protections: “The First 
Amendment does not require schools to tolerate[,] at school events[,] 
student expression that contributes to [the] dangers [of illegal drug use].”253 
The A.J.B. decision should have been no different with regard to the well-
being and safety of a child outweighing another’s freedom of speech. 
V.  CURRENT TRENDS 
A.  The Wild, Wild Internet 
In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, the Supreme Court 
held that government regulation of speech communicated via the internet 
was unconstitutional.254 The Court even applied this reasoning to one 
traditionally allowable exception: “the governmental interest in protecting 
children from harmful materials . . . does not justify an unnecessarily broad 
suppression of speech addressed to adults.”255 The Court affirmed the lower 
court’s ruling that First Amendment protections should not be qualified 
because “the content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought.”256 Of 
all outlets for speech, Reno provided the First Amendment its broadest 
sanctuary in the realm of the internet. 
It is possible, however, that the Court’s prior understanding of the 
internet may no longer be reasonable.257 The Reno decision occurred in 
1997 when the internet was just starting to boom. Google, Facebook, and 
                                                           
250 Jud Campbell, What did the First Amendment Originally Mean?, RICH. L. (July 9, 2018), 
https://lawmagazine.richmond.edu/features/article/-/15500/what-did-the-first-amendment-
originally-mean.html [https://perma.cc/B67F-A69W]. 
251 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
252 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007). 
253 Id. 
254 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (“[G]overnmental regulation of the content of 
speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.”). 
255 Id. at 875 (internal citations omitted). 
256 Id. at 870 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).  
257 See Marantz, supra note 244 (statement of University of California Berkeley Chancellor, 
Carol Christ) (“Speech is fundamentally different in the digital context . . . . I don’t think the 
law, or the country, has even started to catch up with that yet.”). 
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Twitter did not yet exist.258 Since then, we have seen the consequences of 
free speech metastasizing into hateful, violent conduct. A prime example is 
Heather Heyer’s death at the “Unite the Right” rally.259 Her horrific death is 
an oft-shared directive on social media.260 The internet is full of posts 
encouraging individuals to vehicularly run down civilians with different ideas 
than their own.261 “Run them over” is a popular catchphrase on social 
media.262 This kind of speech, rampant on the internet, is tantamount to 
placing a weapon in someone’s hands and encouraging them to commit a 
crime.263  
The Southern Poverty Law Center (“SPLC”) studied the 
dangerous trajectory from idea to action, finding hate sites to be a common 
denominator for an increase in white nationalist attacks.264 In a speech about 
hate speech on the internet before the United Nations High Commission 
on Human Rights, Mark Potok, editor of the SPLC magazine Intelligence 
Report, explains: 
The Net gives racists unprecedented access to . . . teens[] 
who live in their parents’ homes and have computers in 
their bedrooms . . . [and] wouldn’t be caught dead at a Klan 
rally . . . . The Net, with its promise of privacy, lowers any 
social inhibitions they might have had about consorting 
openly with racists and other haters. Where these teens 
would likely have met social disapproval if they expressed 
anti-Semitic or racist ideas at home or in school, they are 
                                                           
258 William Craig, The History of the Internet in a Nutshell, WEBFX (Nov. 15, 2009), 
https://www.webfx.com/blog/web-design/the-history-of-the-internet-in-a-nutshell/ 
[https://perma.cc/X5M4-CNPK]. 
259 Maev Kennedy, Heather Heyer, Victim of Charlottesville Car Attack, was Civil Rights 
Activist, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/aug/13/woman-killed-at-white-supremacist-rally-in-charlottesville-named 
[https://perma.cc/758D-HQ2V]. 
260 See Henry Grabar, “Run Them Down”: Driving into Crowds of Protesters was a Right-





263 See Lind, supra note 76. The ACLU took a position on physical weapons at rallies but 
continues to support speech that is a de facto weapon. Was the hate speech and incitement 
to violence on alt-right and white supremacist websites the same as an actual gun? Id. 
264 Heidi Beirich, White Homicide Worldwide, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Apr. 1, 2014), 
https://www.splcenter.org/20140331/white-homicide-worldwide [https://perma.cc/V6DY-
53XF]. Since the white supremacist website “Stormfront” went live in 1995, its registered 
users have been disproportionately responsible for deadly hate crimes. Id. 
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able to propound such ideas over the Internet in a 
welcoming environment.265 
Since that speech, internet-related hate speech-turned-violent 
dominates headlines.266 In 2012, a white supremacist posted in online hate 
groups right before he murdered six people at a Sikh temple in Wisconsin.267 
A man murdered nine people at a Black church in South Carolina in 2015 
after being radicalized online.268 In 2018, after being active on a white 
supremacist social media site, a man murdered eleven people at a 
Pennsylvania synagogue.269 
Perhaps courts are hesitant to regulate the internet, generally, 
because it serves as a virtual town square, allowing a free exchange of (often 
competing) ideas.270 It has also been suggested that social media sites are 
platforms, not publishers, open to both producers and consumers.271 Also, 
comparisons to authoritarian governments that heavily regulate the internet 
are undesirable.272 
The A.J.B. court, nonetheless, agreed with Reno that First 
Amendment protections are not relinquished just because speech or 
expressive conduct occurs on the internet.273 It quotes the Court, saying: 
“There is ‘no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that 
should be applied’ to online speech.”274 Assuming this reasoning is sound, it 
should work both ways: if publishing a physical manual on how to commit 
a specific crime is unprotected, criminally actionable speech,275 so, too, 
should that parity extend to analogous expression on the internet. While a 
two-tiered system of First Amendment protections would, indeed, be 
inadvisable, the totality of First Amendment freedoms and consequences 
must be applied equally. 
                                                           
265 Internet Hate and the Law, INTELLIGENCE REPORT (Mar. 15, 2000), 
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2000/internet-hate-and-law 
[https://perma.cc/VGE3-BXRB] (highlights from spoken remarks). 
266 Rachel Hatzipanagos, How Online Hate Turns into Real-Life Violence, WASH. POST 





270 Elijah Hack, The Marketplace of Twitter: Social Media and the Public Forum Doctrine, 
88 U. CIN. L. REV. 313, 315 (2019). 
271 Jeff Jarvis, Platforms Are Not Publishers, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 10, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/08/the-messy-democratizing-beauty-of-the-
internet/567194/ [https://perma.cc/W7DP-P6VE]. 
272 Jyh-An Lee, Ching-Yi Liu & Weiping Li, Searching for Internet Freedom in China: A Case 
Study on Google’s China Experience, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 405, 406 (2013). 
273 In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Minn. 2019). 
274 Id. (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)).  
275 TRIBE, supra note 216, at 837. 
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B.  Constitutionality vs. Compassion 
Free speech is considered a core value in the United States, but it 
is not the only core value. University of California professor Judith Butler 
explained the cost of prioritizing ideas over humanity: 
I suppose we are being asked to understand that we will, 
in the name of freedom of speech, willingly allow our 
environment to be suffused with hatred, threats, and 
violence, that we will see the values we teach and to which 
we adhere destroyed by our commitment to free speech . 
. . .276  
Two prominent and unfortunate cases exemplify this concept. 
First, in Virginia v. Black, the Court held that the First Amendment did not 
permit the government to impose special prohibitions on speakers who 
express views on disfavored subjects.277 Cross-burning on the lawn of an 
African American family, it stated, was intimidating but protected speech.278 
With a surprise dissent, however, Justice Thomas (stalwart defender of First 
Amendment protections for most of his tenure on the Supreme Court) 
expressed not only his displeasure with the opinion, but suggested that cross 
burning was so damaging that the Court should expand its limited 
exceptions to include the practice,279 saying, “those who hate cannot terrorize 
and intimidate to make their point.”280 
Then, in Snyder v. Phelps, the Court held that picketing a military 
funeral is constitutional; no matter how offensive, outrageous, or upsetting, 
free speech trumps emotional distress.281 Similar to the Thomas dissent in 
Black, Justice Alito was the surprise dissenter in Snyder, falling on the side 
of compassion over freedom: “[o]ur profound national commitment to free 
                                                           
276 Conor Friedersdorf, Judith Butler Overestimates the Power of Hateful Speech, THE 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/judith-
butler-on-the-power-of-hateful-speech/548138/ [https://perma.cc/7RH2-NLWY]; see also 
Marantz, supra note 244 (quoting Butler) (“We should perhaps frankly admit that we have 
agreed in advance to have our community sundered, racial and sexual minorities demeaned, 
the dignity of trans people denied, that we are, in effect, willing to be wrecked by this principle 
of free speech.”). 
277 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347–48 (2003). 
278 Id. at 363 (O’Connor, J. writing for the majority: “[a State may prohibit] only those forms 
of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm.”). 
279 Id. at 388 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (arguing that certain First Amendment exceptions should 
be allowable). 
280 Id. at 394. 
281 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (“[I]n public debate [we] must tolerate 
insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate ‘breathing space’ to the 
freedoms protected by the First Amendment.”) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 
(1988)). 
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and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred 
in this case.”282  
In 2019, ACLU’s John Powell highlighted the need to protect 
speech, but not to the exclusion of morality: “Racists should have rights . . . 
. I also know, being black and having black relatives, what it means to have 
a cross burned on your lawn. It makes no sense for the law to be concerned 
about one and ignore the other.”283  
C.  In the Absence of Government 
In the gaps left by legislators and the courts, private actors have 
stepped in, protecting human rights while their leaders are silent. After 
Snyder, counterprotests shielded military funerals from the hate-filled sights 
and sounds of the Westboro Baptist Church (“WBC”). In 2012, hundreds 
of Texas A&M students gathered to create a human wall around the funeral 
service for a soldier, blocking the WBC members from view.284 Student 
organizer Elyssa DeCaprio said, “[WBC’s] message is just one of pure hate, 
and it’s not something we want people to listen to.”285 Even the ACLU, which 
has defended the WBC,286 in 2018 changed its guidelines governing case 
selection to take the content and effect of speech into consideration, and 
not just the fact that it is speech, generally.287 
Recently, social media companies stepped in to regulate harmful 
speech on the internet, countering Reno’s assertion that anything goes. 
Facebook and Instagram banned the far-right collective called “the Proud 
                                                           
282 Id. at 463. 
283 Marantz, supra note 245.   
284 Katie Notopolous, Texas A&M Students Block Westboro Baptist Protesters with Human 
Wall, BUZZFEED (Aug. 23, 2020), https://www.buzzfeed.com/katienotopoulos/texas-am-
students-block-westboro-baptist-prot [https://perma.cc/3A7V-F8UA]. 
285 Dan Solomon, Texas A&M Students Shouted Down a Westboro Baptist Church 
Demonstration With Yell Practice, TEX. MONTHLY (Nov. 12, 2014), 
https://www.texasmonthly.com/the-daily-post/texas-am-students-shouted-down-a-westboro-
baptist-church-demonstration-with-yell-practice/ [https://perma.cc/AHK6-U2BJ]. 
286 See Chris Hampton, Why Fred Phelps’s Free Speech Rights Should Matter to Us All, 
ACLU BLOG (Oct. 7, 2010), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/rights-protesters/why-
fred-phelpss-free-speech-rights-should-matter-us-all [https://perma.cc/D7KS-53P9]. 
287 Wendy Kaminer, The ACLU Retreats from Free Expression, WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-aclu-retreats-from-free-expression-1529533065 
[https://perma.cc/SCF3-G4E8] (“Speech that denigrates [marginalized] groups can inflict 
serious harms and is intended to and often will impede progress toward equality.”). 
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Boys,”288 which was designated as a hate group by the SPLC.289 Similar to the 
in-person WBC counterprotests, social media users attempted to drown out 
the online visibility of the hate group by posting images of LGBTQ love 
with the hashtag “#ProudBoys,”290 essentially enacting a virtual “heckler’s 
veto.”291 In 2020, YouTube announced it was updating its hate-speech and 
harassment policies to prohibit “content that targets an individual or group 
with conspiracy theories that have been used to justify real-world 
violence.”292 It is heartening to know that private actors will fill the gaps left 
by the government when it comes to protecting their neighbors. 
D.  Overcorrection 
It is arguable that private actions referenced above overstepped 
when it comes to protecting the emotional lives of our neighbors. “Cancel 
culture” refers to the recent phenomenon of fervent public criticism of a 
person, business, movement, or idea.293 There is often an element of 
shaming or boycotting a business.294 Adding irony to insult, there is now a 
vicious cycle of canceling speech that cancels speech.295 One wonders if 
society is chasing its tail when it comes to freedom of speech.  
Boycotting a product or company based on its ideas is a perfectly 
legal means of persuasion (one might even say coercion). The same goes 
for speaking out against celebrities who espouse unpopular or hurtful views. 
When J.K. Rowling gave her opinion of transgendered women, there was 
                                                           
288 Dade Hayes, Proud Boys Banned from Facebook in Effort to Rein in Hate Groups, 
DEADLINE (Oct. 31, 2018), https://deadline.com/2018/10/proud-boys-gavin-mcinnes-
banned-facebook-effort-to-rein-in-hate-groups-1202492920/ [https://perma.cc/6YCG-
N466]. 
289 Proud Boys, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-
files/group/proud-boys [https://perma.cc/5KYB-HSTA]. 
290 April Siese, Twitter Users Take Over Proud Boys Hashtag with Photos of LGBTQ Love, 
CBS NEWS (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/proud-boys-twitter-hashtag-
photos-lgbtq-love/ [https://perma.cc/8FFS-F6TC]. 
291 The term “heckler’s veto” is used when a heckler shouts down or boos a speaker, 
preventing the speaker from being heard. The heckler’s speech is constitutionally 
unprotected. See generally Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). 
292 The YouTube Team, Managing Harmful Conspiracy Theories on YouTube, YOUTUBE 
OFF. BLOG (Oct. 15, 2020), https://blog.youtube/news-and-events/harmful-conspiracy-
theories-youtube [https://perma.cc/89CY-N7LD]. 
293 Katie Camero, What is ‘Cancel Culture’? J.K. Rowling Controversy Leaves Writers, 
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an instant backlash.296 Fans and co-workers felt that Rowling’s comments 
were hurtful and, given her platform, she should refrain from any similar 
statements.297 Instead, Rowling and more than one-hundred-fifty other well-
known signatories published an open letter in Harper’s Magazine arguing 
that the recent stifling of free speech is creating an “intolerant climate” within 
society.298 In other words, it was a backlash about the backlash. Put another 
way, people told Rowling she should curtail her speech, to which Rowling, 
et al., responded that their detractors should curtail their speech about 
curtailing speech.299 The circularity continued: three days later, a group of 
more than 150 well-known signatories published an open letter against that 
open letter.300 They wrote that the Harper’s letter was written primarily by 
representatives of non-marginalized groups who already have highly-visible 
platforms, out of a fear of “being silenced, that so-called cancel culture is 
out of control, [] fear for their jobs and free exchange of ideas, even as they 
speak from one of the most prestigious magazines in the country.”301 So, 
Group D censors Group C for censoring Group B for censoring Group A. 
Perhaps this is an illustration of the dreaded slippery slope.302 Perhaps the 
A.J.B. court prescribed the right dosage of “medicine,” avoiding an 
overdose. 
E.  In the Shadow of A.J.B. 
In 2020, another challenge to an overbroad statute involving 
threatening behavior reached the Minnesota Supreme Court.303 The court 
did not change its opinion, nor its priorities: “‘The right of free expression 
is as important to many people in their personal and institutional 
relationships as it is in the narrower “civil liberties” related to politics . . . 
.’”304 In State v. Peterson, the Minnesota Court of Appeals again ruled against 
the Minnesota Legislature, finding a stalking-by-telephone statute 
overbroad.305 The court cited A.J.B. to justify its reasoning that, as in the 
stalking-by-mail statute, this provision “‘can prohibit and chill protected 
                                                           
296 Id. 
297 Id. 
298 A Letter on Justice and Open Debate, HARPER’S MAG. (July 7, 2020), https://harpers.org/a-
letter-on-justice-and-open-debate/ [https://perma.cc/SL4Y-PCJB]. 
299 See id.  




302 See Dershowitz, supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
303 State v. Jorgenson, 946 N.W.2d 596 (Minn. 2020). 
304 Id. at 605 (citing State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 589 (Or. 1982)). 
305 State v. Peterson, 936 N.W.2d 912, 923 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019). 
35
Alexander: The Elasticity of Protected Speech: A Balance of Breadth
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2021
2021] THE ELASTICITY OF PROTECTED SPEECH 567 
expression’” and was thus overbroad, despite the Appellant’s repeated, 
harassing behavior.306 
In direct juxtaposition to the A.J.B. court’s jurisprudence 
regarding free speech versus suicide encouragement307 is Commonwealth v. 
Carter, wherein the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the involuntary 
manslaughter conviction of a minor for the death of her friend after verbally 
encouraging him to commit suicide.308 The Carter decision can be viewed as 
a curtailment of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom. However, it is 
possible that, in doing so, it prevented future loss of innocent life. Both 
Melchert-Dinkel and A.J.B., while differing on their interpretations of the 
legality of coerced suicide, protected speech-as-conduct more absolutely 
than Carter. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Mr. Powell has an answer—or, at least, an analogy—for the 
challenging balance of breadth: he compared harmful speech to carbon 
pollution.309 It is, indeed, legal to drive a car, but doing so, unfettered, will 
hasten climate catastrophe. However, the government can regulate 
greenhouse emissions, private actors can commit to renewable energy 
sources, and civic groups can promote public transportation alternatives.310 
If not, Powell warns, “[e]veryone should be allowed to drive a car and that’s 
that. But doing so wouldn’t stop the waters from rising around us.”311 
As for A.J.B., the Minnesota Supreme Court understood that to 
claim a statute is overbroad, a balance must be achieved between upholding 
the constitutional right to free expression and the negative societal result if 
no limits are in place. However, the court turned a blind eye to the Supreme 
Court’s Chaplinsky ruling that highlighted the importance of limiting speech 
“which by [its] very utterance inflict[s] injury.”312 By ignoring cases like 
Chaplinsky, the expulsion of the stalking-by-mail statute and the drastic 
narrowing of the mail harassment statute were missed opportunities to add 
an exception to First Amendment protections by rendering the hateful, 
dangerous speech demonstrated in A.J.B. legally intolerable. While 
professing to prioritize constitutional equilibrium, the scales tipped 
appreciably away from personal security in favor of free speech.  
                                                           
306 Id. at 921. 
307 In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn. 2019).  
308 Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559, 559 (Mass. 2019). 
309 Marantz, supra note 245. 
310 Id. 
311 Id. 
312 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
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We end as we began, with Justice Holmes. In 1919, the venerable 
jurist stated: “The question in every case is whether the words used are used 
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and 
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress 
has a right to prevent.”313 Nearly one-hundred years later, we are no closer 
to an invariable answer to that question.314 Clearly, the past remains 
prologue, as the free speech argument continues to vacillate, upholding the 
tension necessary to maintain its tenuous balance. 
                                                           
313 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
314 Lind, supra note 76 (“[W]hether the best way to protect the powerless is to stand against 
the principles that could be used to crush them.”). 
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